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Background: Program logic is one of the most used tools by 
the public policy evaluator. There is, however, little 
explanation in the evaluation literature about the logical 
foundations of program logic or discussion of how it may be 
determined if a program is logical. This paper was born on a 
long journey that started with program logic and ended with 
the logic of evaluation. Consistent throughout was the idea that 
the discipline of program evaluation is a pragmatic one, 
concerned with applied social science and effective action in 
complex, adaptive systems. It gradually became the central 
claim of this paper that evidence-based policy requires sound 
reasoning more urgently than further development and testing 
of scientific theory. This was difficult to reconcile with the 
observation that much evaluation was conducted within a 
scientific paradigm, concerned with the development and 
testing of various types of theory. 
 
Purpose: This paper demonstrates the benefits of considering 
the core essence of a program to be a proposition about the 
value of a course of action. This contrasts with a research-
based paradigm in which programs are considered to be a 
type of theory, and in which experimental and theory-driven 
evaluations are conducted. Experimental approaches focus on 
internal validity of knowledge claims about programs and on 
discovering stable cause and effect relationships—or, 
colloquially, ‘what works?’. Theory-driven approaches tend to 
focus on external validity and in the case of the realist 
approach, the search for transfactual causal mechanisms—
extending the ‘what works’ mantra to include ‘for whom and 
in what circumstances’. On both approaches, evaluation 
aspires to be a scientific pursuit for obtaining knowledge of 
general laws of phenomena, or in the case of realists, 
replicable context-mechanism-outcome configurations. This 
paper presents and seeks to justify an approach rooted in 
logic, and that supports anyone to engage in a reasonable 
and democratic deliberation about the value of a course of 
action. 
 
It is consistent with systems thinking, complexity and the 
associated limits to certainty for determining the value of a 
proposed, or actual, course of action in the social world. It 
suggests that evaluation should learn from the past and have 
an eye toward the future, but that it would be most beneficial 
if concerned with evaluating in the present, in addressing the 
question ‘is this a good idea here and now?’ 
 
Setting: Not applicable. 
 
Intervention: Not applicable 
 
Research design: Not applicable. 
 
Findings: In seeking foundations of program logic, this paper 
exposes roots that extend far deeper than the post-
enlightenment, positivist and post-positivist social science 
search for stable cause and effect relationships. These roots lie 
in the 4th century BCE with Aristotle’s ‘enthymeme’. The 
exploration leads to conclusions about the need for a greater 
focus on logic and reasoning in the design and evaluation of 
programs and interventions for the public good. Science and 
research are shown to play a crucial role in providing reasons 
or warrants to support a claim about the value of a course of 
action; however, one subordinate to the alpha-discipline of 
logical evaluation and decision making that must consider 
what is feasible given the context, capability and capacity 
available, not to mention values and ethics. Program Design 
Logic (PDL) is presented as an accessible and incremental 
innovation that may be used to determine if a program makes 
sense ‘on paper’ in the design stage as well as ‘in reality’ 
during delivery. It is based on a configurationalist theory of 
causality and the concepts of ‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’ 
conditions. It is intended to guide deliberation and decision 
making across the life cycle of any intervention intended for 
the public good. 
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The classic Foundations of Program Evaluation 
(Shadish et al., 1991) describes the five 
attributes of any theory of evaluation: Theory 
of Social Programming, Theory of Knowledge, 
Theory of Valuing, Theory of Use, Theory of 
Practice. More recently, Donaldson and Lipsey 
(2006) discuss the role of theory in evaluation 
and set out the importance of Program Theory, 
substantive Social Science Theory, and 
Evaluation Theory. Both of these important 
works provide a useful description of the 
universe of ‘theories’ that evaluators should be 
aware of when approaching evaluation—they 
encourage us to think, what are programs, 
what can we/ should we want to know about 
them, and how can we know it? Substantive 
social science theory that describe the world 
and evaluation theory that prescribe how to do 
evaluation (Alkin & Patton 2020) are essential 
considerations for evaluation. This paper 
simply argues that programs themselves 
should not be considered as a type of theory 
and that doing so can lead to negative 
consequences for evaluation. 
This paper is about a fundamental re-
orientation towards programs. It proposes a 
move from treating programs as theories 
subject to scientific analysis, to courses of 
action subject to logical analysis. In concrete 
terms, this paper is concerned with a 
distinction lying at the heart of much program 
evaluation—the distinction between program 
logic and theory of change. It is the central 
purpose of this paper to demonstrate that once 
we view a program as a plan, or a proposition 
about the value of a course of action, rather 
than a theory, it is much easier to understand 
and evaluate logically. This also provides for 
more cost-effective evaluation in line with 
Scriven’s principle that an evaluation should 
not cost more than the value of the 
information it provides (Scriven, 1976).1 
	
1  Scriven looms large over this paper, not just for the 
injunction about cost effective evaluation, but in his 
suggestion that evaluation must be considered alongside 
logic as a candidate for ‘master transdiscipline’ (Scriven 
2008). This paper treats logic and evaluation as two sides 
of the same coin and logical evaluation as the alpha 
discipline for considering the value of a proposed course 
Science is about “what kinds of things 
there are, as well as how the things there are 
behave” (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 20). Evaluating a 
theory is about whether it provides an 
accurate, useful or ‘valuable’ description of 
reality. Scientists should, and do, spend much 
of their time evaluating their theories, a 
process that involves much deliberation in the 
pursuit of collective knowledge. It may seem 
reasonable then to classify our interventions 
into the world as a type of thing whose 
behaviour may be understood using a 
scientific approach: in treating programs as 
theories. It is the central claim of this paper 
that in so doing we confuse the domain of 
science with the domain of engineering. 
Taking this approach ignores the useful 
distinction between knowledge about the 
world, and applied knowledge for making 
change in the world. This slight slip in our 
application of the word ‘theory’ has far 
reaching consequences for the practice of 
evaluation.  
Treating programs as a type of theory 
tends towards a paradigm of scientific 
research and evaluation that is concerned 
with testing theory. Arguments for the 
important but supportive role for theory in 
program evaluation are further developed 
throughout this paper. However, the primary 
claim is that programs are not, on close 
examination, best understood as theories at 
all. It does not help to talk about lower case ‘t’ 
theory or ‘theory incarnate’ (Pawson, 2013) as 
these terms obscure the fundamental nature 
of programs. The core essence of a program is 
considered to be a proposition about the value 
of a particular course of action: a plan or 
argument drawing on a set of reasons to 
suggest it will be effective. What little 
discussion there is on logic and the theory of 
argumentation in the literature on program 
evaluation tends to be focused on the forming 
of evaluative judgements (Schwandt, 2015). 
This paper seeks to describe a primary role 
for logic in program design and evaluation. In 
of action for the public good. Program Design Logic 
described later in this paper provides a tool to conduct 
logical evaluation at any stage of the design or delivery of 
a program or intervention. 
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so doing, it seeks to pivot evaluation from a 
discipline concerned with testing theory to one 
focused on evaluating arguments. The results 
of a failure to more seriously engage with logic 
in program evaluation are revealed in ‘program 
logic’ diagrams that appear to provide a wish 
list of intended outputs and outcomes, rather 
than a serious attempt at explicating the ‘logic’ 
of any particular intervention. The focus on 
program theory tends toward evaluation 
focused on a single underlying ‘theory of 
change’. Program logic is relegated to ‘a tool 
that describes the theory of change underlying 
an intervention, product or policy’ (Frechtling, 
2007) despite the fact that innumerable 
theories must be leveraged for a program to be 
effective. There is considerable irony in the fact 
that very few, if any, theories of change have a 
corresponding ‘theory of causality’ or 
description of how change itself comes about. 
This has major implications for our discussion 
of logic in program design if we are to avoid 
this same shortcoming and provide a 
description of how programs bring about, 
generate or lead to change.  
The paper concludes by describing a tool 
to support evaluation in the form of an 
incremental innovation called Program Design 
Logic (PDL). PDL provides a simple and 
coherent system for developing evidence-
based policy and programs. It offers a 
diagrammatic model similar to an outcomes 
hierarchy, using the logic of ‘necessary’ and 
‘sufficient’ conditions in place of ‘outputs’ and 
‘outcomes’. An evaluation using PDL will first 
determine if a course of action makes sense ‘on 
paper’, before we attempt to determine if it 
makes sense ‘in reality’. It is the hope that PDL 
is used ex-ante by politicians, public servants, 
journalists, and citizens as much as by 
evaluators. In this way, PDL can be considered 
to be a tool for ‘prospective evaluation’, as set 
out by the US GAO, that ‘focuses on a 
systematic method for providing the best 
possible information on, among other things, 
the likely outcomes of proposed programs 
(Datta, 1990). It may also be used to answers 
questions about the ‘coherence’ of a 
prospective policy or program, as set out in the 
updated DAC guidelines for evaluation 
(OECD/DAC Network on Development 
Evaluation, 2019). 
 
The Ancient Origins of Logical 
Deliberation About the Value of a 
Course of Action 
 
Aristotle is credited with developing the first 
systematic means of critical thinking and 
logic. In the Art of Rhetoric (2012) Aristotle 
concerned himself not with formal logical 
mathematical proofs but with means for 
considering propositions, including 
deliberation about the best form of action in a 
given circumstance. His concept, the 
‘enthymeme’ is a form of logic based on 
syllogism. It has a series of premises that, if 
true, lead to a conclusion.  
An enthymeme is a logical syllogism of the 
same form used in deductive logic but with two 
distinct features. First, some assumptions are 
unstated and, second, there are premises in 
the argument—as well as the conclusion—that 
are probable rather than certain. The 
movement from premise to conclusion is like 
an informal argument (Toulmin, 2003a) based 
on warrants, or reasons, that allow us to make 
inferences from the facts associated with one 
premise to the next or from the premises to the 
conclusion. This paper suggests that 
programs as propositions can be considered 
as an ‘enthymeme’ and a special case of 
deliberation when the subject is the value of a 
proposed course of action.  
To compare an enthymeme with deductive 
logic, let us consider the most famous example 
in deductive logic, ‘Socrates is a man, all men 
are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal’. This 
is a valid argument using deductive logic as 
the conclusion is already inherent in the 
premises and no new information is created by 
the argument. If the premises can be 
established, then the form of the argument is 
the guarantee of its truth. Science may be 
used to classify Socrates as a man, it may also 
be used to gather inductive evidence that ‘all 
men are mortal’. The work of establishing the 
premises, that is, the reasons or warrants for 
believing the premises, is provided by science; 
however, the conclusion that Socrates is, 
himself, mortal belongs to logic, in this case, 
deductive logic. Of course, while we say 
science established the premises, they will 
have themselves been established as the result 
of a conclusion formed using scientific 
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methods (something along the lines of death 
rates of 100% of humans over time, leading to 
the logical conclusion that all men are mortal) 
and, as such, are also the result of logic. The 
point here is not only that science proceeds 
under the supervision of logic but that, once 
established, premises don’t need to be re-
tested. Instead, they can be marshalled to 
develop an argument about the value of a 
course of action. For example, once it is 
established that immunisation for polio 
protects against polio, our argument about the 
value of an immunisation program just needs 
to make sure we implement it faithfully. While 
uncertainty always exists, and adverse 
consequences are possible, this means that 
the evaluation of a program of immunisation 
can focus on issues for implementation, rather 
than on measuring outcomes, i.e. in terms of 
polio rates. 
Consider an argument for rescuing 
Socrates in the form of a deliberative 
enthymeme. We might propose, ‘Socrates has 
been condemned to death. If we rescue 
Socrates, he will survive. If he survives, the 
youth of the future will be better educated; 
therefore, we should attempt to rescue 
Socrates.’ The first point is to note the missing 
assumptions—these might include ‘Socrates is 
a man’ and ‘all men are mortal’ because we 
can assume the audience will already agree 
that Socrates can be harmed by death. The 
next is to note the lack of certainty. There is 
clearly a lot of room for deliberation about the 
validity or well-groundedness of the argument 
for attempting to rescue Socrates. This specific 
argument contains a large degree of 
uncertainty and also questionable inferences. 
There is an assumption that if we rescue him, 
he will survive; but maybe Socrates has 
already been poisoned? There is an inference 
that if we attempt to rescue him, we will 
succeed; but maybe all past attempts at 
rescuing condemned prisoners from this 
location have failed? Knowing the latter would 
provide evidence that might prevent us from 
inferring that we should attempt to rescue 
Socrates. We may even question whether it 
can be inferred that the youth of the future will 
benefit if Socrates is rescued, given that Plato 
and others had already written down much of 
what he had to teach. We may not have 
sufficient warrants or good reason to infer a 
number of steps in the argument, up to and 
including that we should attempt to rescue 
Socrates. We might conclude that this 
argument or enthymeme does not appear to be 
sound. Unlike deductive logic, this does not 
follow with certainty from the validity of the 
premises and the form of the argument but 
requires a judgment to be made, it is therefore 
informal. 
Let us take a further step and consider an 
argument about a particular method for 
rescuing Socrates. Perhaps it could be argued 
that we should bribe the prison guard, so that 
we can switch the hemlock with a harmless 
substance (Socrates has decided if the 
authorities say he should die then being the 
responsible citizen that he is, he will probably 
drink the hemlock and might alert the guards 
that he is being rescued). We then argue that, 
as Socrates is being transferred from his 
confines to the ritual place of death, we send 
in a group of people from Thebes to abduct 
him. We then support him in exile, to the 
greater glory of their city and the benefit of 
their youth. Of course, all sorts of reasons will 
have to be given for how to replace the 
hemlock, with what substance, how much to 
bribe the guard and which Thebans can be 
trusted, etc. There is, of course, much to be 
discussed about the logic of this plan of action, 
which is not reducible to the form of the 
argument but, instead, includes the artful 
selection and presentation of compelling 
evidence. Incidentally, the importance of art, 
as much as science, to an argument is how 
rhetoric received its bad name. It does not 
follow, however, that just because persuasive 
techniques exist, that there is no inherent 
logic that can be interrogated in relation to the 
soundness and well-groundedness of an 
informal argument. 
Now, let us consider the value of a program 
of rescuing political prisoners more generally. 
We are now moving from one-off actions to 
something that more closely resembles a 
program. We will be concerned with whether 
the program is likely to be and is, in fact, 
generally effective, rather than the merits of a 
specific plan. In developing this program, we 
might develop a set of criteria for who should 
be rescued, which reflects our ‘values’. We 
might describe how much effort we should 
exert to rescue these people and set out a 
range of options that might be more or less 
effective in different situations relative to cost. 
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These options might be established based on 
explanations using theories of human 
behaviour, data about how and why they were 
or were not effective in the past, and how 
much they cost. Once options coalesce into a 
program, we would expect compelling reasons 
to be provided as to why this program will 
work. We might expect specific evidence to 
support a claim about the benefits of a 
particular method in a particular situation. We 
would expect these reasons to be compelling 
enough to encourage us to contribute funds to 
the program and we would want to know if 
these reasons turned out to be good ones. 
Once funded, we may wish to hold this 
program to account and ask how many 
attempts were successful and, further, where 
and when and under what circumstances they 
were successful. We may even refine our 
program as a result. This sequence of 
reasoning might describe a typical program 
development or policy cycle (Althaus, 
Bridgman, & Davis 2017), with lots of reasons 
and arguments provided along the way. The 
role of theory here is as a special class of 
warrant or reason to infer some element of the 
program will be effective. It should be clear by 
this stage why this paper argues for the 
primacy of logic and argumentation over 
theory when it comes to program design and 
its evaluation. Programs are built on theories 
but they are not, themselves, a theory; they 
are a specific argument and should be 
evaluated as such. 
Despite this long tradition in 
argumentation to draw upon, this is not how 
program logic has developed. Program logic 
has received substantial attention in the 
evaluation literature and by public servants 
commissioning and conducting evaluation of 
public policies and programs (Frechtling, 
2007; Funnel & Rogers, 2011; McLaughlin & 
Jordan, 2015). While there is much discussion 
about the form of logic models and their use in 
communication, including the need for 
‘decreased mental effort’ and ‘perceived 
message credibility’ (Jones et al., 2019), there 
is relatively little explanation of the logical 





Program Logic in Practice 
 
Program logic, in practice, may be defined as a 
diagram or model that sets out the important 
components of an intervention and how they 
are combined to deliver a specified outcome. 
This is usually in the form of a series of boxes 
that contain propositions linked by arrows. 
There are numerous different forms this can 
take—the two most common are the outcomes 
hierarchy and the log frame. The former being 
a vertical series of outcomes that are expected 
to occur if the intervention is effective. The 
latter referring to the intended inputs, 
outputs, outcomes and impacts of an 
intervention. In both cases, if there is any 
description of the logic behind the sequence of 
boxes it is referred to as ‘if-then’ logic—an 
implicitly successionist theory of causality to 
which we will return later. There are a number 
of logical problems with both these models 




The Kellogg (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2004) 
and Wisconsin models (Taylor-Powell & 
Henert, 2008) set out a ‘chain of outcomes’ 
between inputs, outputs and outcomes. It has 
benefits in clearly communicating key 
information about a program. It typically 
displays information such as the resources 
and activities as well as the intended outputs 
and outcomes. It is primarily designed to 
satisfy a need ‘to enhance program 
performance through outcome accountability’ 
(Hernandez, 2000). Partly for this reason, 
these models tend to look more like a wish list 
than a logical proposition. They provide a 
series of claims about outputs and outcomes 
but do not articulate any logic that may be 
subjected to interrogation. It may focus on 
intended outcomes that may become the 
subject of an evaluation and assumptions—
‘the beliefs we have about the program, the 
people involved and how we think the program 
will operate’ (Taylor-Powell & Henert, 2008)—
but provide no clear means of identifying flaws 
in each step or the overall logic of the design 
at an early stage. The approach of Renger and 
Titcomb (2002) places more emphases on 
considering ‘antecedent conditions’ as well as 
‘target activities’ and measurement issues; 
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however, all these models focus on evaluation 
in terms of accountability for outcomes. These 
types of models are sometimes considered to 
provide a ‘road map’, which may be very useful 
for communication and plans for 
measurement, but less so for interrogating the 
validity of a propositions about the value of 
this course of action. Although they take the 
form of a causal model or an argument 
structure—a series of boxes and arrows—they 
are neither good arguments nor causal 
models, lacking warrants in the case of the 
former and probability coefficients in the case 




This approach sets out a series of outcomes to 
be obtained in sequence. It identifies the 
conditions that are to be achieved and places 
them in an ‘outcomes hierarchy’ or sequence 
(Rogers & Funnell, 2011). Typically, each 
condition statement is broken down into its 
component parts and defined in a ‘data matrix’ 
in terms of the attributes of that condition 
statement, and then into outcomes that may 
be observed and/or measured in existing or 
new data sets for monitoring and evaluation. 
Together, the outcomes hierarchy and data 
matrix provide a roughly sequential and 
sufficiently detailed checklist for the evaluator 
to follow and to determine the extent to which 
each intended condition was, in fact, brought 
about. This approach also identifies 
assumptions that the program is making and 
external factors that will also affect results 
relevant to the success of any program. This is 
the version of program logic that I was taught 
by my mentor, Chris Milne. I have used it 
valuably numerous times and it is the version 
that I have adapted in designing Program 
Design Logic. I owe a great debt of gratitude to 
Chris for the many discussions we have had 
about program logic, as I do to Gill Westhorp 
who helped me understand the power and 
value of theory in evaluation even if this paper 
has a different focus.  
The main drawback of the outcomes 
hierarchy for program design is the absence of 
a theory of causality that would allow someone 
to critique a program design in the design 
phase. There often appears to be an implicit 
assumption that one outcome causes the next. 
Most often, what is described, however, is that 
one condition lower down the hierarchy is a 
precondition for another higher order 
outcome. This is far from being a cause and it 
means the outcomes hierarchy is far from 
being a causal model. Assumptions are listed 
but they are usually disembodied from each 
step in the hierarchy—often only appearing as 
general assumptions about the operating 
context. Sometimes even core social science 
theories or ‘theories of change’ are described 
as assumptions. There is nothing wrong with 
an outcomes hierarchy for designing a post 
hoc evaluation—it is very useful for identifying 
key issues for an evaluation to examine. What 
it is less good for is surfacing the logical flaws 
in an intervention design at the outset. The 
tacit acceptance of ‘if-then’ logic is rooted in a 
linear view of causality that tends to overlook 
the idea that assumptions are equally as 
important as the conditions brought about by 
the intervention itself. This kind of program 
logic can lead to the development of programs 
with unrealistic expectations, money wasted 
trying to measure outcomes that could not 
logically occur, and, ultimately, frustration, 
cynicism, lack of progress and a high risk of 
program failure. 
  
Common Problems with Logic Models 
 
Regardless of the form of program logic, it is a 
common critique that it provides an artificially 
linear ‘chain of outcomes’. It is a critique often 
rebutted with ‘it’s just a model’. However, 
there is a deeper point to be considered. 
Standard program logic diagrams suffer from 
an implicit assumption about how change 
occurs (i.e. theory of causality), which is often 
reflected in program logic being seen as having 
a ‘causal chain’. As such, pipeline models and 
outcomes hierarchies are sometimes 
described as displaying ‘if-then’ thinking. The 
Kellogg guide to program logic actually uses 
the phrase ‘if this happens, then we hope this 
next thing will happen’. Unfortunately, this 
approach does not provide any evidence to put 
a brake on overly optimistic ideas about a 
program. On inspection, pipeline models are 
not structured causal models in the form 
meant by scientists interested in analysis; 
they do not include mediators, confounders, 
probability statements or any of the core 
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elements used in causal diagrams (see Pearl, 
2019). The outcomes hierarchy addresses this 
problem somewhat better than the pipeline 
model, but it is still deficient. What we find in 
an outcomes hierarchy is an articulation of ‘if 
not x, then not y’. For example, if someone is 
aware of a program, it does not cause them to 
enrol in that program; however, it may be a 
necessary precondition. That is, if they were 
not aware of the program, then they would not 
enrol.  
The realisation that neither the pipeline 
model or the outcomes hierarchy provided the 
‘chain of cause and effect’ that is so often 
referred to when discussing program logic was 
hard to understand. This realisation was the 
first step towards the idea that what we are 
setting out in an outcomes hierarchy is most 
often a claim that ‘if not this early condition, 
then not this later condition’. The second step 
was much more difficult. It emerged from 
trying to understand what exactly is meant 
when we say that a program causes some 
outcome. I spent many years trying to work 
with a realist ‘generative’ theory of causality as 
applied to an entire program. I couldn’t make 
it work until I realised that this was not the 
only theory of causality, and that maybe 
different theories of causality are more or less 
useful for different problems. 
 
Theory of Causality 
 
In this paper, we will deal with only a very 
small number of candidate theories of 
causality that are useful for evaluation. We 
focus on those theories most associated with 
‘manipulable’ causes as we are concerned with 
the effects of programs, rather than, more 
generally, with how things in the world come 
to be. A theory of causality is very different to 
a specific theory of change. A theory of 
causality describes how we think programs, or 
interventions in general, lead to, generate, 
result in, or cause change. Pawson (2008) has 
outlined three candidate theories of causality. 
 
§ The presence of something is invariably 
followed by the presence of something else 
(successionist). 
§ The configuration of certain somethings 
immediately brings about a new something 
(configurationalist). 
§ The presence of something with certain 
latent powers interacting with the latent 
powers of something else in a certain 
context creates a new something 
(generative).  
 
The successionist approach derives from 
the empirical and positivist tradition, whereby 
‘causation’ cannot be observed directly but is 
a construct of the mind built up from 
experience. This approach follows the position 
of Hume and John Stuart Mill that a causal 
relationship exists if, 1) the cause preceded the 
effect, 2) the cause was related to the effect, 
and 3) we can find no other plausible 
explanation for the effect other than the cause 
(Shadish et al., 2002). Programs are 
conceptualised as a complicated series of 
cause and effect relationships. The theory of 
causality is based on what can be observed 
and echo’s Hume’s search for a ‘constant 
conjunction of events.’ The goal is the 19th 
century positivist dream of Comte to find laws 
that govern human behaviour, and then 
perhaps unconsciously but perniciously, to 
shape a world that seeks to control the 
individual through knowledge of these laws 
(see Comte & Lenzer (ed), 1975). In program 
logic, there is often an attempt to render these 
forces into a ‘causal chain’ using ‘if-then’ 
thinking as discussed above. This theory of 
causality is so often implicit, that the history 
of modern evaluation has in many ways been 
a debate about the virtues and drawbacks of 
randomised controlled trials or RCTs as a 
means of measuring the size of an observed 
effect following a purported cause. As an 
example, a discussion about causation by two 
lions of the field, Cook and Scriven, is in effect 
a series of arguments for and against RCTs 
(Cook et al., 2010).  
This successionist approach works well 
when causes can be investigated with a 
counterfactual and an experimental design. 
The RCT allows for causal inference when the 
assumptions that underpin it are met; a stable 
intervention that can be sufficiently specified, 
ample sample size, detectable effect sizes and 
most controversially, when knowledge is to be 
gained by controlling for rather than 
incorporating context into the equation 
(Hawkins, 2016). Applied to more complicated 
and complex entities, such as programs 
delivered by people, it is difficult to be precise 
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about the part of an intervention each 
intended beneficiary is experiencing; 
therefore, it is difficult to be precise about 
what parts of the intervention caused 
anything. This is crucial for any causal claim 
with external validity that is for knowledge 
derived from the past but can be useful for 
replicating past effects in future contexts. Lest 
we be seen as overly critical about 
successionist causality, there is substantial 
scope for development of a ‘new science of 
cause and effect’ (Pearl, 2019) in program 
evaluation as much as in fundamental 
science. Using Bayesian statistics that bring 
context into the equation, this approach uses 
casual diagrams that articulate hypothesised 
causes, effects, mediators and confounders. 
This is the era of ‘personalised medicine’, 
where modelling is used to find out what 
works for you, rather than whether an 
intervention works per se. These new methods 
can deal with non-linear dynamics—a core 
source of critique by realists of the positivist 
position (i.e., the view that context matters 
and that different people react in different 
ways to the same stimulus). These new 
methods of causal diagramming could provide 
a new structure for program logic that is able 
to describe the causality inherent within a 
program; however, this has not yet been 
achieved by program logic commonly in use.  
A configurationalist theory of causality 
recognises that a number of factors need to 
come together. Rather than a ‘causal chain’, 
there is a ‘causal package’ that brings about a 
change. This is the approach Nancy 
Cartwright (2012) uses to describe evidence-
based policy. It is also the theory that 
underpins Charles Ragin’s work and the 
method of Qualitative Comparative analysis 
(Ragin, 2009). Using this conception, causal 
analysis is like baking a cake; for success, you 
need the right combination of ingredients, 
mixed in the right way, and placed in the right 
context (i.e., an oven at the right temperature). 
The strict order is not always important (i.e. 
	
2  We don’t cause gravity; we arrange the conditions 
between a ball and an edge to leverage and allow gravity 
to cause the ball to fall. There is an infinite regress here, 
in looking for ‘initial causes’, because each condition is 
itself a result of actions that have conditions and causes; 
for example, the causes of me deciding to push the ball 
towards the slope. It will not be useful for our discussion, 
however, to descend into this abyss. In program logic, we 
wet before dry ingredients or the other way 
around) and it doesn’t make sense to say how 
much of each ingredient causes the cake—you 
need all of them as well as the right 
environment for the cake to bake. You may not 
need to get very detailed about things such as 
how the ’rising agent’ in the cake works, 
unless the rising agent turns out to not be 
working. This is the theory of causality 
considered most useful for articulating the 
initial logic of a program. Using this 
conception, a program is a sufficient 
condition. We will turn to this component of 
necessary and sufficient conditions after we 
deal with one more theory of causality.  
A generative theory of causality explains 
the underlying mechanism of change and the 
features of context that are important for 
change to occur. It refers to abstract, latent or 
dormant mechanism that make up a ‘real 
world’ and have ‘real effects’ (Bhasker, 2008). 
A program or intervention works through 
actions that leverage these mechanisms (often 
the reasoning and resources of individuals) in 
certain contexts to generate outcomes 2 . To 
continue with the cake metaphor, the cause of 
the cake rising is the release of carbon dioxide, 
which is due to bringing the leavening agent, 
baking soda or yeast, into a context of 
moisture and heat. As with the 
configurationalist approach, it still doesn’t 
make sense to say how much the leavening 
agent did it and how much the heat of the oven 
did it—they were both necessary. But further 
to the configurationalist approach, it specifies 
the mechanism—the ‘rising’ occasioned by the 
release of carbon dioxide. The realist 
generative conception is perhaps the most 
useful way for understanding how change 
occurs for individuals and for developing 
theories about what works for whom, under 
what circumstances and how. Realist 
Mechanism, Context, Outcome configurations 
may provide the most ambitious articulation 
of the casual power inherent in an 
intervention. 3   In this author’s experience, 
are changing conditions that allow for the unleashing, 
firing or strengthening of causal mechanisms that already 
exist in the world. 
3 CMOs refer to the context before the purported causal 
mechanisms. This can be confusing because the features 
of context are only relevant in relation to the causal 
mechanisms. It may be less confusing to refer to a MCO, 
ordering the causal recipe in terms of mechanisms then 
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however, these are too detailed and granular 
as a starting point for thinking about a 
program and its evaluation. A realist approach 
requires substantial time and expertise and 
attention to the nuances of program design 
that are not often apparent in the everyday 
world where policies and programs are 
developed. A realist approach may be useful 
when building a program, when trying to 
understand why an intervention that was 
thought to be logical is not effective, or when 
trying to work out how to modify or target an 
intervention for maximum impact; though it 
may require too much depth of analysis for 
everyday program evaluation.  
The conclusion of this brief survey of 
theories as applied to program logic is 
pragmatic. It builds on an understanding that 
the goal of evaluation is to reduce uncertainty 
about the value of interventions in the world. 
In evaluation, where time and money are 
major concerns, we are restricted to the ‘fair 
price of causal information’. We are not 
concerned with research with the much more 
difficult goal of determining some enduring 
truth about the nature of the world. The theory 
of causality we invoke will depend on the 
questions we can afford to answer. It will also 
be built on an understanding of nature and 
science as ‘stratified’. Nature into the domains 
of the real, actual and observable (Bhaskar, 
1979) and science into the different disciplines 
for interrogation of nature, including physics, 
chemistry and biology (Toulmin, 2003b). We 
use physics to understand the behaviour of 
sub-atomic particles, chemistry to understand 
the behaviour of molecules, and biology to 
understand the behaviour of animals; 
however, we do not talk about animal 
behaviour in terms of valance shells, neutrinos 
or dark matter because it is an unhelpful level 
of granularity and goes beyond the strata of 
science with which a science is concerned. 
None of these stratifications are ‘right’ in a 
philosophical sense but are more or less useful 
depending on the degree of granularity 
required to answer a specific question. Instead 
of finding the ‘right’ theory of causality, the 
pursuit should be concerned with the most 
useful one in the circumstances. While 
	
the context in which it is effective; this may make the 
outcome easier to follow, even if the logical ‘form’ of the 
MCO or CMO is equivalent.  
evaluation is distinct from science, the analogy 
is that the understanding of the causal powers 
within a program may require us to draw on 
theories of causality with different ‘depths’, 
depending on how deep we can afford to go. In 
the same way as almost every major 
evaluation theorist says, “questions come first 
and method choice comes second” (Cook et al., 
2010, p. 113), we may say that what you are 
trying to explain comes first and your theory 
of causality comes second.  
The conclusion as applied to program logic 
is that it may be best when designing an 
intervention to put aside a successionist or 
generative theory of causality. There was no 
succession in the logic diagrams and the 
generative trees were obscuring the forest. At 
the design stage, and when considering the 
program as a whole, it may be most 
appropriate to invoke a configurationalist 
theory of causality and view a program as a 
‘causal package’. This was the third step in the 
development of PDL. This position follows the 
work of Nancy Cartwright (2012) in developing 
evidence-based policy. It developed into PDL 
with two further developments, a 
consideration of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, and the recognition that the 
essential nature of a program is not a type of 
theory but an argument about the value of a 
proposed course of action. We will discuss 




To appreciate the foundations of necessary 
and sufficient conditions, it is instructive to 
consider Hume’s 1739 definition of cause, 
which claims, ‘We may define a cause to be an 
object followed by another and, where all the 
objects, similar to the first, are followed by 
objects similar to the second. Or in other 
words, where if the first object has not been, 
the second never had existed.’ As Judea Pearl 
(2019) points out, these two sentences are not 
equivalent. Pearl takes issue with the first 
sentence for confusing correlation with 
causation, while he views the second as an 
attempt to introduce counterfactual thinking. 
It can, however, also be seen that the first 
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sentence provides a definition of cause as 
sufficient, because observing the first object is 
sufficient for observing the second. The second 
sentence adds that the first object must be 
necessary for the second. Thus, in 
combination, we are describing two different 
elements of causality—necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  
This is the approach of seeing causes as 
INUS conditions (Mackie, 1974). On this 
account, a cause is an Insufficient but Non-
redundant (i.e., it is needed) part of an 
Unnecessary (i.e., there are other ways) but 
Sufficient condition. The famous example of 
this is the faulty electrical circuit, which is 
considered as the cause of a house burning 
down. While the short circuit was necessary 
for the house to catch fire in the way that it 
did, this was not the only way it could catch 
fire, and was not, on its own, enough as the 
fire also required the presence of oxygen and 
the house to be built of combustible materials.  
Applied to program design, while an 
intervention is rarely necessary or the only 
way to achieve something (e.g., there is more 
than one way to increase social cohesion), it 
must be sufficient for its objectives (e.g., to 
bring together diverse members of society in a 
social sporting exercise). The program will 
have components that we think are necessary 
and, when all achieved, must be sufficient to 
achieve an outcome. The program, however, 
might not be sufficient to cause a very 
ambitious change or ‘ultimate intended 
outcome’ to which it only contributes. On this 
account, it is questionable whether it is ever 
useful to measure how much an intervention 
contributed to this type of outcome as the 
program was never designed to be sufficient 
for achieving it (i.e., whether a homelessness 
program is intended to solve homelessness, 
rather than to merely address one aspect of it).  
We will return to INUS causality as it has 
a central place in PDL and represents the 
fourth step in the development of PDL. For 
now, it is important to note that in avoiding 
use of the term ‘theory of change’, PDL is 
engaging explicitly with theories of causality, 
	
4 While all three of these theorists were. Like Weiss, early 
proponents of experimental evaluation, they all modified 
their views over time as they confronted the problems of 
the internal and external validity of knowledge claims that 
derive from experimental evaluation. ‘Internal validity’ 
but is not concerned with testing ‘program 
theory’ that is so often the focus of modern 
evaluation practice. 
  
Conflation of Program Logic with 
Program Theory or Theory of Change 
 
The centrality of ‘theory of change’ and 
‘program theory’ in modern theory-driven 
evaluation practice can be explained by an 
examination of evaluation history. The origins 
lie in the early experimental and positivist 
approaches to evaluation (Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell, 2008) and dissatisfaction with the 
usefulness of ‘black box’ evaluations of 
programs. These invovled careful observations 
of outcomes but provided little explanation of 
how the outcomes were achieved or what 
precisely would be required to replicate the 
outcomes elsewhere. One early legend of the 
field, and original proponent of experimental 
design Carol Weiss who struggled with its 
practical application and ability to identify 
program effects opened an edited book with 
‘This book is dedicated to overcome the kind of 
naivete that I began with’ (Weiss, 1972). Weiss 
(1995) often discussed the importance of 
theories (note the plural) of change that 
underpin a program. This concern with 
reasoning also led to Rossi championing a 
‘theory-driven’ approach to evaluation 
(Shadish, Cook, & Leviton, 1991)4 . Pawson 
took this position to its logical conclusion 
when he referred to programs as ‘theories 
incarnate’ (Pawson, 2013). Described in the 
realist evaluation reporting standards ‘In a 
realist evaluation, the assumption is that 
programmes are ‘theories incarnate’. That is, 
whenever a program is designed and 
implemented, it is underpinned by one or more 
theories about what ““might cause change”, 
even though that theory or theories may not 
be explicit” (Wong et al., 2016, p. 1). This idea 
is that programs are composed of actions and 
these actions may or may not fire certain 
‘mechanisms’ that generate change, 
depending on the circumstances and context 
in which the action is applied. The 
being concerned with claims that the program (or some 
part of the program) caused an outcome, ‘external validity’ 
being concerned with the claim that similar outcomes 
from rerunning the program can be expected in future 
times and places. 
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identification of mechanisms and outcome 
configurations is the basis of a realist 
approach to evaluation. Pawson is concerned 
with replicable, or portable CMO 
configurations. In order to be scientific, 
Pawson and other realists have had to dispose 
of the idea of a program or action having a 
certain causal force (and therefore being 
replicable) and restrict themselves to dealing 
with the psychological and sociological 
‘mechanisms’ that have causal powers and, 
that if leveraged by program or action, may be 
expected in some, but not other, 
circumstances and contexts to generate 
change.5 While not everyone is a realist, many 
evaluators place central importance on the 
idea of theories for program design and on 
theory-driven evaluation. These evaluators 
may or may not make use of a form of logic 
model but tend to focus deeply on the reasons 
why a change should be expected. These tend 
to have been written as ‘theories of change’ 
rather than as simple reasons. 
A theory of change may describe how or 
why the move from the problem to outputs 
and outcomes in a logic model is expected to 
occur. A theory of change (ToC) may be written 
about a whole program (i.e. program theory of 
change) OR about a component within a 
program. Extending an example from Funnel 
and Rogers (2011), a theory of change that is 
also a program theory may be written as: 
 
IF we provide apples to people who have 
insufficient vitamin C AND people eat those 
apples THEN we expect their levels of 
vitamin C will clinically rise significantly 
enough that they will avoid scurvy 
BECAUSE apples contain enough vitamin 
C to overcome a deficiency. 
 
While a theory of change about a 
component within a program may be written 
as: 
IF we shine the apples that are delivered to 
people who like shiny apples but leave 
them un-waxed for those who have more 
organic tendencies AND we place the 
	
5 In so far as realists seek knowledge of CMOs, rather than 
seeking to warrant programs as effective, it would appear 
sensible for realists to avoid the term ‘program theory’ at 
all. The realist evaluation discourse is about the adequacy 
of CMO configurations for explaining observed patterns or 
‘demi-regularities’. Inevitably ’jobbing’ realists (to use a 
Pawson term) must have conversations about a program 
apples by a person’s desk rather than in a 
common bowl THEN they will eat the apples 
BECAUSE attractiveness and proximity 
support the decision to eat apples. 
 
In the examples above, these statements 
are offered as theories of change. They are, in 
fact, claims supported by reasons, which 
makes them, in other words, parts of an 
argument. Theories are about what things 
there are in the world and how they behave. A 
program is just one way amongst many 
potential means for bringing about change. A 
good program, like any good piece of 
technology, should be built on sound theory. 
A theory plays an important role in providing 
reasons why a program or component is 
thought to be effective BUT a program, itself, 
is not a theory. A program will often draw on a 
main substantive social science theory (e.g. 
‘the theory of scurvy’) but the theory is only 
important in so far as it provides a warrant or 
reason to think the program activities will be 
effective if implemented as intended (often by 
following a ‘theory of action’). For example, in 
a parenting program, there may be a theory 
about why improving certain mothers’ 
parenting skills in a certain way will lead to 
better parenting, but there may also be a 
theory as to why distinct approaches to 
marketing the program will work differently for 
mothers depending on their circumstances, 
motivations, media consumption, etc. A 
‘theory of action’ sounds a lot more like a plan 
than any kind of theory – we must be cautious 
of scientism. This paper argues that it is 
unhelpful to consider interventions primarily 
from the perspective of ‘theory’ and that is 
more appropriate and useful to conceive of a 
program as a logical argument about a course 
of action supported by evidence or reasons to 
think that it will be effective.  
I was recently asked at a conference why I 
no longer believe that programs are theories 
incarnate. I responded, ‘I don't think it's 
wrong, I just don't think it’s the most useful 
way to see a program. Is catching a plane to 
or initiative as a whole. In these situations, this paper 
suggests the logic of the proposition could be explicated in 
realist terms by the extent to which program activities are 
founded on an understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms generating an actual problem and are 
appropriately designed to harness CMO configurations to 
make a meaningful difference to that problem. 
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get home from a conference, theory incarnate? 
Is flying a plane, theory incarnate? Is flight, 
theory incarnate?’ And this is the nub of it, 
successful programs leverage many theories—
but to treat the overall program as a type of 
theory leads to evaluation where the program 
is the unit of analysis. This is despite the 
realist unit of analysis being context-
mechanism-outcome configurations. It seems 
in the everyday world of public policy the 
program often remains the unit of analysis—
this paper suggests dealing with this reality 
and focusing program evaluation by ensuring 
programs are logical—including but not 
limited to, that they are leveraging appropriate 
theories. There is a grave risk that too much 
discussion of theory provides a fig leaf for 
programs that sound good ‘in theory’ but may 
not be adequately specified to have much 
chance of being useful.  
Catching a flight home is 'a plan' and one 
that can be evaluated without much useful 
recourse to theory, just some rational decision 
making. Flying a plane might be theory 
incarnate but there are many, many theories 
about the world that are being incorporated 
(the Bernoulli effect is a key one but so are 
theories about gravity, wind dynamics, air 
pressure, metallics, etc.) and, when we launch 
the plane, we are not testing these theories but 
trying to leverage or make use of them. Flight 
itself may well be theory incarnate but 'flight' 
in the abstract is a long way from a practical 
means of getting home from a conference.  
Those delivering social programs are more 
like social engineers than social scientists and 
methods of evaluation should be more akin to 
those that are useful in applied engineering 
than in pure science. A program should be 
evaluated like technology is evaluated; not 
how scientific theories are evaluated. For 
example, if we are evaluating a battery, we will 
see whether it works and how long it lasts, we 
will rarely need to get into the theory of 
chemical reactions and theories of electron 
valance shells; if we do, it will not be to test 
these theories, so much as to make sure we 
are properly leveraging them. If the battery is 
not working as intended, despite all logical 
connections, then we may wish to seek to 
determine if we are properly leveraging an 
established theory. In rare cases, we may 
develop a new theory but experimenting on 
people in society to identify new theories of 
behaviour should not be a primary goal for 
public policy and its evaluation.  
The founder of modern argumentation, 
Stephen Toulmin, in Return to Reason, argued 
that the success of science in some domains 
and the quest for certainty and specialisation 
of thought into disciplines has led us to 
valorise ‘abstract theories of the world that 
apply in general and, therefore, nowhere in 
particular’ (Toulmin, 2003b). Once it is 
realised that a program is not a theory but a 
proposition, it becomes obvious that applying 
methods that are scientific in some domains of 
research will not make an evaluation 
scientific—this is well known ‘scientism’ that 
must be called out. This does not mean that 
there is no place for RCTs—there certainly is; 
however, the decision-making criteria should 
not be the hierarchy of methods but the 
method that will provide the best answer to a 
specific question. Once we realise the 
evaluand for what it is—a proposition about a 
course of action rather than a scientific 
theory—we can be a lot more accommodating 
of the different methods that may generate 
evidence for better decision making and 
reduce uncertainty about the value of that 
course of action. 
  
Conclusion of the Discussion of Theory 
 
Developing and testing theories is the focus of 
scientific research. Evidence-based policy is 
about putting theories to work. Program logic 
is sometimes referred to as a model of a 
program’s theory of change. This assumes the 
program is a theory about how to achieve 
ultimate outcomes rather than a proposed 
course of action for a specific time and place. 
The pernicious result of thinking about 
programs as theories of change is the logical 
fallacy that it is useful to measure how much 
a program contributed to an ultimate 
outcome—an outcome for which it was never 
designed to be sufficient. This limits much 
‘impact evaluation’ using ‘scientific methods’ 
such as RCTs to a means of providing 
accountability by measuring outcomes that 
can be attributed to the program. When 
applied to complex social programs in complex 
social systems the results of RCTs are unlikely 
to generate scientific evidence to better inform 
future decisions as we navigate the complex 
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and adaptive systems into which we intervene 
(Hawkins 2016). The realists worked out the 
problems of the experimental design, but the 
systems thinkers have most fully leveraged the 
insights of complexity to propose effective 
means of navigating uncertainty (Kurtz & 
Snowden 2003, Renger 2015). 
 
Program Design Logic 
 
To recap, this article suggests that a program 
or intervention is, at its core, a proposition 
that a certain course of action will lead to a 
certain set of outcomes. An evidence-based 
program provides good reasons to expect 
actions will lead to outcomes in the future. 
Program Design Logic (PDL) provides a 
framework to determine if a proposition makes 
sense ‘on paper’ and outlines how it may be 
determined if it makes sense ‘in reality’.  
What do we mean by ‘makes sense’? 
Thomas Schwandt (2015) has engaged heavily 
with the concept of warrants in evaluation. He 
has done so primarily in the context of 
evaluators forming valid judgments about the 
value of a program or intervention. He is 
concerned with how a fact or outcome provides 
evidence about the value of an intervention. 
PDL simply steps back one step further and 
considers the program itself to be a form of 
argument that must be sound and well 
grounded. That is, that there are reasons to 
think or warrant that the program is likely to 
be effective, before the first participant is even 
enrolled.  
A PDL is simply a visual depiction of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions—with 
space to identify assumptions and external 
factors. Assumptions are crucial to the 
functioning of the program and will often need 
to be evaluated. External factors will moderate 
the extent to which the program or 
intervention outcomes contribute to ultimate 
intended outcomes, sometimes called 
contingent conditions. As we discussed, an 
intervention is rarely the only way to achieve 
something (e.g. there is more than one way to 
	
6 At least it is thought to be needed. For cost effective 
programs, the focus should initially be on what is truly 
necessary or the ‘minimal viable product’. Over time, there 
may be opportunities to test the proposition that some 
aspect of a program is actually redundant or superfluous. 
increase social cohesion) but it must be 
sufficient for its objectives. It will have 
components that we think are necessary and 
when all achieved are sufficient for achieving 
the objective. In the philosophy of causation, 
each component (i.e., output) is considered to 
be an INUS condition. That is an insufficient 
but non-redundant (i.e., it is needed6) part of 
an unnecessary (i.e., there are other ways), but 
sufficient condition (i.e., the program). It is 
important to be realistic about what the 
intervention is sufficient for and what it will 
only contribute towards. Typically, the overall 
intended outcome is more ambitious than 
what the program can reasonably be expected 
tdeliver on its own. 
PDL uses an outcomes hierarchy approach 
with two major differences. First, it has an 
explicit configurationist theory of causality. 
Second, it uses the language of ‘necessary’ and 
‘sufficient’ conditions in place of ‘outputs’ and 
‘outcomes’7. While outputs and outcomes are 
important—the distinction between the two is 
the source of much confusion and a matter of 
perspective rather than an absolute attribute 
of some or condition. One person’s output is 
another person’s outcome and vice versa, 
whereas a condition statement simply is. For 
example, an increase in a child’s self-esteem 
may be an outcome to a parent; however, it 
may simply be an output of some training 
program whose ultimate outcome is increased 
school attendance. In government, there is 
much angst spent over the distinction between 
outputs and outcomes. If we instead focus on 
the condition statements that a PDL suggests 
are necessary to our intervention and 
sufficient for bringing about a better state of 
affairs, we can focus on the conditions that are 
most doubtful, most variable, or most affected 
by individual differences and features of 
context etc., rather than arguing over whether 
something is an output or an outcome. 
The key features of PDL shared with an 
outcomes hierarchy are the boxes with 
condition statements. These are propositions 
or conditions in the form of ‘who or what is in 
what state’. These can be arranged in a 
7  The term ‘outcome’ is used interchangeably with 
‘condition’ because this is familiar language; although it 
would be more correct to say condition. Outcome may 
imply that the thing immediately prior caused it—an 
inherently successionist way of thinking. Established 
language, however, is hard to shift. 
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hierarchy as some steps are logically prior to 
others (you can’t put a cake in the oven until 
you have mixed the ingredients), but we are 
not claiming that one thing leads to the next. 
We are claiming that one or more intended 
objectives or ultimate outcomes are achieved 
by progressively achieving subordinate 
conditions. It is actually pretty simple to set 
out the intended conditions that some 
program activities are meant to bring about. 
The tricky bit is being realistic about the 
extent of possible achievement and in 
surfacing assumptions. 
Typically, an overall intended outcome is 
more ambitious than what the program is 
resourced to deliver on its own. The options 
are to change the program design to make it 
more ambitious—essentially doing more 
things to increase the likelihood that the 
program is sufficient for higher order 
outcomes. The other option is to accept the 
ambitions for which the program is logically 
sufficient and focus on achieving these. 
Measuring contribution towards higher order 
outcomes may be useful for accountability and 
to compare the outcomes of different 
interventions, but it is not a sensible or cost-
effective approach for scientific or formative 
evaluation if the program was never 
hypothesised or designed to be sufficient for 
some goal.  
In a PDL (see Figure 1)—as in Aristotle’s 
enthymeme—there are usually propositions 
that are not explicitly stated. A program will 
also almost always require implicit or explicit 
assumptions about the context for the 
necessary conditions to provide a sufficient 
‘causal package’. These assumptions are 
things the program is relying on to be the case 
for it to be effective, but about which it is not 
doing anything. For example, if we are building 
schools to educate children, we are assuming 
that there will be teachers available to be hired 
to teach in the schools. Major assumptions 
should be checked because the conditions 
brought about by assumptions are just as 
important as the conditions brought about by 
an intervention in determining whether an 






Figure 1. Example of a PDL. 
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Warrants, Assumptions, and Theories of 
Change 
 
A sound argument or proposition about the 
value of a course of action needs warrants or 
reasons to support the claim. A warrant is 
what allow us to infer or move from the 
observation of some fact towards claiming that 
this fact is ‘evidence’ for something. This is 
where the theories of change are used in PDL.  
In addition to a one-page diagram, PDL will 
sometimes include an articulation of the 
reasons why we expect it will be effective in the 
form of ‘if we do xx, we will achieve yy because 
of zz’. This may be considered by some to be a 
theory of change that seeks to hypothesise or 
claim how and when the program is working, 
or likely to work, to deliver its intended 
objectives. These reasons will include a mix of 
common sense reasons as well as what others 
have referred to as capital ‘T’ and lower case ‘t’ 
theory. In its most mature form, we would 
expect a PDL to be accompanied by realist 
theories that have been developed and tested 
and include mechanism, context and outcome 
configurations. Not all PDL, however, will need 
to be or can afford to be so well developed as 
to include realist theories of the mechanism 
and contexts by which each premise is 
achieved. Initially, it just needs to ‘pass the 
pub test’, assuming this test were conducted 
over half an hour and involved drawing on 
napkins rather than a loud and glib single 
slogan. 
 
Evaluation of Program Design Logic ‘On 
Paper’—Is it Sound? 
 
A valid PDL must provide a sound argument. 
It must follow that if the premises of the 
argument, which are the necessary conditions, 
are brought about and the assumptions hold, 
then the conclusion, which is the sufficient 
conditions, will follow with near certainty. This 
does not mean that we expect the program 
activities to always, for everyone, lead to the 
necessary conditions (a task for the next step 
in evaluation), but we do expect that if they 
were achieved, then the outcomes or sufficient 
conditions would follow. 
  
Necessary conditions + assumptions = 
sufficient conditions or intended outcomes 
While this article stresses that the focus 
should be on evaluating what a program is 
logically sufficient for achieving, at times, it 
will be useful to evaluate the contribution that 
the program made to longer term outcomes. 
 
Sufficient conditions + external factors = 
longer term or contingent outcomes 
 
Evaluation of a Program Design Logic ‘In 
Reality’ 
 
Once a PDL is evaluated to be sound, the next 
step is to evaluate it ‘in reality’; that is, to 
implement methods to determine the extent to 
which the premises in the argument are well 
grounded. Here, the steps will be very similar 
to any evaluation informed by an outcomes 
hierarchy. The goal may be to test the weakest 
links in the argument—either in relation to 
necessary conditions that are expected to be 
brought about by actions or assumptions that 
may be ‘heroic’. The goal may be to understand 
for whom and in what circumstances the 
program activities fire certain mechanisms 
that generate change for some but not all 
people, communities, organisations, etc.  
It will also be useful when considering the 
efficiency of some intervention to test whether 
the necessary conditions were actually 
necessary. They may be superfluous or 
redundant. It may be that the same conditions 
are being achieved in locations where some 
‘necessary’ conditions do not hold. For 
example, in the PDL in Figure 1, it may not 
actually be necessary that both defence and 
prosecution counsel have sufficient 
information to negotiate an early resolution.  
The inferences in the argument of a PDL 
are of the form, ‘if not this, then not that’, or if 
not P, then not Q. This form of reasoning is 
referred to as modus tollens. Once all 
conditions considered necessary are laid out 
in the proposition, we infer that these will be 
sufficient for some new condition or outcome. 
This form of inference is using modus ponens, 
‘if all these conditions, then this condition’, or 
if all these Ps, then Q. For a discussion of 
modus tollens and modus ponens, see Dagli, 
1998. 
The warrant that supports us to say if not 
P, then not Q, is that one is ‘logically 
antecedent’ or that one is a necessary 
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precondition of the other—‘if a person is not 
aware of the program, then the person cannot 
enrol in the program’ (which is not the same 
thing as ‘no one is enrolled in the program’. 
Someone may be enrolled without their 
knowledge, but the person cannot enrol in the 
program of their own volition, if they are 
unaware of the program).  
The warrant that supports us to say if ‘all 
these Ps, then Q’ is the theory of 
configurational causality. That is, if we bring 
all these things together in the right way, we 
will achieve some outcomes. 
In public policy, the warrants that permit 
the inferences or the reasons we should accept 
the interferences are drawn from the wide 
variety of evidence that is available for the 
development and evaluation of public policy. It 
may include results from past research or 
evaluation, current theories about how the 
world works, or common sense. 
  
Some Potential Criticisms of PDL 
 
There are a number of criticisms that could be 
levelled at PDL—that this is nothing new and 
that we cannot expect a logical model to be 
helpful because real life is too messy to place 
in a model, and our actions will rarely, if ever, 
pan out as we hoped. And even if it does pan 
out as we hoped, different people will respond 
to our program differently, leading to 
hopelessly heterogeneous results. Here some 
of these potential criticisms are addressed. 
  
PDL is nothing new. Outcomes hierarchies have 
been around for long time. What has not been 
around for a long time is an approach to 
evaluate the logic of a design. In many 
respects, PDL is using an outcomes hierarchy 
approach with an explicitly configurationalist 
theory of causality. It is used to surface 
implicit assumptions and inform discussion 
about the value of proposed course of action. 
It seeks to move the discussion away from 
abstract theories of how the world works, to 
remove the fig leaf of ‘theory’ and provide a 
method for identifying problems with the logic 
of how a proposed course of action is intended 
to work. This approach does not require 
knowledge of any particular theory. Using 
PDL, logical flaws may be spotted and debated 
by any reasonable person. PDL aims to provide 
a tool for this rationale discourse between 
politicians and the public and between the 
commissioners and providers of public 
programs and interventions. PDL aims to be 
useful for evaluation, as other forms of 
program logic can be, but its higher aim is to 
support rationale discourse about the design 
of public policy—once certain values and 
objectives have been agreed upon. In this 
sense, PDL provides a tool for Prospective 
Evaluation Synthesis (PES), as developed by 
the GAO. PES focuses on proposals and on the 
conceptual, operational and empirical 
questions of ‘Logically, should the proposal 
work?’, ‘Practically, could the proposal work?’ 
and ‘Historically, have activities conceptually 
and operationally similar to the proposal 
worked in the past?’’ PDL fuses these 
questions into a single question of “Logically, 
should it work here?’ The reasons or warrants 
that will be marshalled will be variously 
conceptual, operational and empirical. PDL 
and the associated data matrix and 
specification of methods to answer key 
evaluation questions also guide empirical data 
collection about the proposed course of action, 
if and when it is implemented, to answer the 
question ‘Does it work here?’ 
 
PDL is over simplistic. The real world is much 
messier than the model describes. A PDL may 
appear aloof from the vicissitudes and 
complexities of life. It may give an appearance 
that social policy is simple and linear. A PDL 
is not attempting to describe a complex reality. 
The purpose of a PDL is not to ignore the 
messy reality, where complex 
interdependencies determine the extent to 
which any intervention actually delivers 
change. PDL is about having a logical plan. 
Even if ‘no plan survives contact with the 
enemy’, it is necessary for deliberative and 
democratic public policy that people can 
debate the value of a course of action. It is 
attempting to bring to the surface the implicit 
logic to a proposed course of action. A PDL 
may be more or less detailed, depending on 
which parts of the proposition require the 
greatest justification—the more contested, the 
greater the need for accompanying text to 
provide the reasons and warrants as to why a 
certain set of conditions are expected to be 
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sufficient for generating a desired state of 
affairs.  
A PDL focuses on what a program may be 
sufficient for achieving. A program may have 
some fairly lofty ambitions; however, a sound 
PDL will be clear about what program 
activities should be sufficient for achieving 
(given certain assumptions), and what they 
may only contribute towards (in addition to 
external factors). Many programs are not 
sufficiently designed or resourced to achieve 
higher order outcomes. As per Rossi, (1985) 
few interventions will be strong enough, or 
sufficient, for actually addressing the big 
problems of poverty, crime and drug addiction 
that plague our societies. If a PDL is not 
ambitious enough, either more actions are 
required or there must be greater reliance on 
assumptions, which may turn out to be 
‘heroic’. Program designers can increase the 
scope of action to bring more things under the 
control of the program and leave less to 
assumption. They may also debate the extent 
to which assumptions are reasonable or not, 
but PDL simply points out that these are the 
assumptions on which a design is reasoned to 
be a good or effective course of action. 
 
PDL is not scientific. This is correct—PDL focuses 
on the same logic that is necessary in science, 
but it does not explain how and why change 
happens. People are different and will react 
differently to the same program; this is the 
central insight of realist approaches to 
evaluation. PDL is not setting out to test 
theories but to leverage them. PDL is an 
argument structure that says when certain 
premises are true, then some conclusion is 
true. It must be valid and well grounded. The 
validity comes from an assumption that the 
conclusion (the outcome for which the 
program is sufficient, i.e., that participants 
learn parenting skills) will follow if all the 
premises are true. For example, ‘participants 
engaged with the program’. The well 
groundedness of the PDL comes from evidence 
as to whether, and to what extent, each 
premise was supported in reality. We know 
that how different people engage with each 
activity will vary; we also know there is a rich 
	
8 Realist evaluation will often move from an explanation of 
what happened to suggesting that this is evidence of what 
will happen in future similar contexts. A central problem 
world of theory that will seek to explain which 
people, in what circumstance, will or will not 
engage with the activity.8  
PDL starts as an argument that is valid if 
the premises are true and the assumptions 
hold. This is just an initial step. Further 
evaluation of the extent to which each premise 
holds for different people in different 
circumstances (e.g. what lead different people 
to engage), and knowledge of the extent to 
which assumptions about the content into 
which the intervention was placed, actually 
hold, should lead to refinement of the PDL—
maybe new actions or conditions are 
considered necessary, maybe old ones are no 
longer considered necessary. This experience 
should lead to a stronger argument that uses 
evidence of the extent to which each premise 
is well-grounded and how it may be further 
achieved. In the theory-driven evaluation 
literature, this is similar to how theories of 
action are designed to activate theories of 
change—in PDL, theories are special cases of 
reasons to think it will work. The evidence 
obtained from an evaluation is often about 
what worked; it cannot claim to be about what 
works unless it is based on a sound approach 
to the development and testing of social 
science theories. This is, however, outside the 
scope of PDL and often too ambitious a goal for 
the effective use of public money in developing 
cost-effective ways of addressing aspects of 
social problems that we are, honestly and in 
good faith, actually setting out to address.  
Despite the goal of a scientific evaluation—
either on the positivist or realist account—
most evaluators, especially later in their 
careers, experience considerable humility 
about the ability of elevation to identify stable 
cause and effect relationships. Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) have shown why this is the case—
because program evaluators ignored the 
mechanisms that, in context, were responsible 
for any outcomes. It was never the actions 
themselves. When combined with Rossi’s 
(1985) Iron Law, this may give pause to anyone 
with the audacity to design a program. It 
should cause one to question the utility of 
seeking to evaluate a program by measuring 
its outcomes in terms of an average effect size. 
for realist evaluation, as with all approaches, moving from 
evidence of what happened in the past to what will hold in 
the future. 
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Some complexity science theorists go further 
and identify situations where any attempt at 
identifying stable cause and effect 
relationships is untenable (Kurtz & Snowden, 
2003). Approaches to evaluation, informed by 
the science of systems, also tend to focus less 
on measuring attributable outcomes and place 
a greater focus on monitoring system 
conditions (Renger, 2015). 
 
PDL is too cold and rational. PDL provides a tool 
to evaluate whether a proposed course of 
action is logical ‘on paper’ as well as to guide 
data collection activities to determine whether 
it makes sense ‘in reality’. The focus is on logic 
and what we think we know, rather than on 
participatory methods, appreciating values, 
directing innovation or creative problem 
solving. This is true. PDL is not an approach 
to work out the rational approach to solving a 
problem and is silent on this process. 
Similarly, PDL does not seek to place logic over 
ethics or adjudicate whose values matter. PDL 
starts when a decision is made about a 
particular approach to solving a problem; it is 
concerned with whether that approach is 
sound. There may well be a great need for 
public policy to look more seriously at the root 
causes of problems and to engage in more 
participatory and creative co-design of 
solutions, but this is a task that precedes PDL. 
A word of warning. In informal 
propositions and argumentation, there is no 
form of argument that allows us to draw 
conclusions from the validity of the form alone, 
as is the case in deductive reasoning. The 
strength of an informal argument is up to the 
reasoning ability of the proponents of a course 
of action and the type of evidence that a 
particular audience will find credible and be 
persuaded in their decision. This deliberative 
from of argumentation is the basis of ancient 
and modern democracies alike. It is exactly 
what is required in the modern business case, 
prospective evaluation, new policy proposal or 
political platform. And here it is important to 
issue a warning—given the existence of logical 
fallacies and the influence of style or rhetoric 
on an audience, it is imperative to be aware of 
these ‘tricks of the trade’ in evaluating any 
argument. Evaluation should address the 
strength of reasons given as to why a course of 
action is reasonably likely to be effective—it 
should stick to facts and logic, rather than rely 
on the style of an orator. PDL provides a tool 
to set out the inherent logic of any proposed 
course of action, aside from the method of 





The central goal of this paper is to position 
logic as a core requirement in all stages of the 
policy and program design cycle—particularly 
in the design phase before an intervention is 
released into the world. Throughout the paper, 
we have valorised reasonableness and 
humility over truth and certainty—
emphasising logic, rational debate and 
decision making under time and resource 
constraints. This paper has been critical of 
‘program theory’ and ‘theory of change’ as 
concepts that risk over-extending theory and 
hiding under-developed logic, leading to 
programs that with some rational 
interrogation could be seen to have a high risk 
of failure before the first participant is 
enrolled.  
The central claim of this paper is that a 
public policy program is, in essence, not any 
type of theory, but a proposition about the 
value of a course of action. But this paper 
should not be read as a retreat from theory. 
Far from it. PDL is based on a configurational 
theory of causality that is built with necessary 
and sufficient conditions. Treating programs 
as a form of theory has led to much confusion 
and waste in the expenditure of evaluation 
budgets on research projects and, somewhat 
ironically, a general failure to engage with any 
actual theory of causality. Too much focus on 
theory can cast a veil over a program and 
exclude reasonable people from participating 
in a discussion of why a program may or may 
not be effective. It can lead to a sense of 
inevitably about a particular policy or 
program, when any social problem can be 
addressed leveraging many different 
theories—a left-wing or a right-wing person 
will have different ideas about any given 
problem, its root causes, means by which it 
may be addressed, or even whether a problem 
exists at all. 
It follows from the conception of a program 
as a plan or proposition that evaluation should 
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be concerned with the validity and well-
groundedness of that proposition. The validity 
of the policy or program proposition is whether 
the premises, if all true, would lead to the 
conclusion or intended outcomes. To translate 
into common policy language, if the outputs 
were all achieved, whether it is likely that the 
short-term outcomes would follow. The well-
groundedness of the argument is the extent to 
which the premises, i.e. outputs, are likely to 
be, or were actually achieved. This requires 
warrants, reasons and, in many cases, 
theories of the way the world works and 
empirical data about what actually happened. 
Theory, however, is subordinate to logic.  
 This paper has sought to demonstrate how 
PDL can provide a tool for those responsible 
for making decisions about the design and 
implementation of a policy or program. It is 
concerned with evidence-based policy and 
prospective evaluation. PDL may deliver 
benefits by identifying and subjecting to 
examination the reasons to think some 
proposed course of action is likely or is, in fact, 
generating intended outcomes. PDL like most 
other forms of program logic is also designed 
to identify evidence that may demonstrate 
which parts did work. The intercalation of 
‘design’ between program and logic signifies a 
focus on ensuring that whatever is designed, 
by whatever means, provides sound reasons to 
think it and its component parts, will work 
with a specific group of people in a specific 
time and place. PDL is silent about the 
adequacy of a program in addressing root 
causes and not intended for adjudicating 
between different social science theories or 
ideologies. It is not a tool for research but for 
evaluation based on a configurationalist 
theory of causality and the concepts of 
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